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Abstract. This article by Juri Lotman from the third volume of Trudy po znako-
vym sistemam (Sign Systems Studies) in 1967, deals with the problem of artistic 
modelling. The general working questions are whether art displays any charac-
teristic traits that are common for all modelling systems and which could be the 
specific traits that can distinguish art from other modelling systems. Art is seen 
as a secondary modelling system, more precisely, as a play-type model, which is 
characterised simultaneously by practical and conventional behaviour and cons-
tant awareness of the possibility of alternate meanings to the one that is currently 
being perceived. At the same time art has play-like elements but is not the same as 
play, since play is inherently rule-bound, whereas art is a more flexible model the 
purpose of which is truth. Art is a special type of modelling system, since it is on 
one hand suitable for storing very large amount of complex information, but on 
the other hand it can increase the stored information and transform the consumer.
I
1.0. Art is one of the forms of modelling activity.
1.1. In the “theses” presented here, we consider the question what can be 
gained by understanding art through its inclusion among other model-
ling systems and whether such inclusion is productive, that is:
1.1.1. Will it enable us to reveal traits in works of art that are common 
to models in general?
1.1.2. Will it enable us to reveal specific traits that distinguish art from 
other modelling systems?
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1.2.0. No definition of art or a work of art will be given here. For the pre-
sent work, an intuitive conception, allowing us to distinguish art from 
non-art, will be sufficient. Particular definitions will be given below 
when necessary. But giving an explicit definition of art is not the aim 
of this work.
1.2.1. From the multitude of definitions of model, the most general one 
will be used here: a model is an analogue of an object of perception 
that substitutes it in the process of perception. It is presumed that more 
detailed definitions are either concerned with particular individual 
forms of models, or can be derived from the present definition.
1.3.0. Modelling activity is human activity in creating models. In order 
that the results of this activity could be taken as analogues of an object, 
they have to obey certain (intuitively or consciously established) rules of 
analogy and, therefore, be related to one modelling system or another.
1.3.1. A modelling system is a structure of elements and rules of their 
combination, existing in a state of fixed analogy to the whole sphere of 
the object of perception, cognition, or organization. For this reason, a 
modelling system may be treated as a language.
1.4. It is useful to call those systems that have natural language as their 
basis and accumulate additional superstructures, thus creating second-
order languages, secondary modelling systems. We will discuss the place 
of art among secondary modelling systems.
2.0. Therefore, art is always an analogue of reality (of an object), trans-
lated to the language of the given system. Therefore, a work of art is 
always conventional [условно] and, at the same time, must be intui-
tively recognized as an analogue of a certain object, that is, it must be 
“similar” and “dissimilar” at the same time. Emphasizing only one of 
these two inseparable aspects breaks the modelling function of art. The 
formula of art is: “I know that it is not what it depicts, but I clearly see 
that it is what it depicts”.
2.1. The content of art as a modelling system is the world of reality, 
translated to the language of our consciousness, translated in turn to the 
251The place of art among other modelling systems
language of the given form of art. In this case, the oppositely directed 
processes of creation and reception of art may be seen as occurrences 
of re-encoding with specific rules of semantic equivalency distinctive 
to each stage.
2.1.1. The fact that at one stage, the necessity arises to translate the sys-
tem to a natural language, is what allows us to define the broad range 
of modelling systems where we will include art as a “secondary” one. 
In this case, “secondary” systems do not refer to only systems with two 
layers, but also multi-layered ones with different numbers of levels.
2.2. A model differs from a sign as such in that it not only substitutes a 
certain denotat, but substitutes it productively in the process of percep-
tion or organization of an object. In that case, if the relation between 
language and denotat in a natural language is historico-conventional, 
then the relation between model and an object is determined by the 
structure of the modelling system. In this sense, only one type of 
signs — iconical signs — can be equated to models.
2.3. Works of art are constructed by the principle of iconical signs. It 
follows therefore, that the information contained in the work of art is 
inseparable from its modelling language and from its structure as a 
sign-model.
2.3.1. Therefore, the structural nature of a work of art is not an external 
“form” that — no matter how much is spoken about its “unity” with 
content — could be disentangled from it. It is a realization of the infor-
mation contained in the model. It can be said that specifically artistic 
content is syntagmatic content. Semantic relations only give us a trans-
lation from the language of art to a language of non-art.
2.3.2. However, the previous definition is true only in the broadest 
and roughest of sense. Since both the denotats and our conceptions of 
them (meanings) may be different from each other, forming only small 
chains of related elements with differentiated meanings, the distinction 
between semantic and syntagmatic relations as a whole may be reduced 
to syntagmatic meanings of different levels.
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3.0. From the definition of a work of art as a sign-model, it follows that 
all the main characteristics of not only of a model but also of a sign 
apply to it. From this in particular, it follows that a work of art must be 
realized in a certain material substance.
II 
Art is a special form of modelling activity. 
In order to clarify the specificity of art among other forms of modelling 
activity, some more explanation is necessary.
1.0. Let us suppose that, when performing some kind of activity, a per-
son is facing the necessity to turn to a model of this activity in order to 
gain some sort of knowledge. For instance, a tourist plotting his route 
will pause moving through the countryside while moving on the map, 
and then resume his real journey. Without going into details on the 
nature of each of these actions, we will only note one thing: their strict 
differentiation. In one case, what is realized is a practical behaviour, in 
the other — a conventional [условное] one. In the first case, the goal is 
to reach practical results, in the second case — to gain certain know-
ledge necessary for reaching these results. In the first case, the situation 
the person is in is real, in the second — a conventional one.
1.1. A characteristic feature of behaviour realized using scientific-cogni-
tive models is their clear distinction from practical, everyday behaviour. 
No one using a geographic map imagines that he is at the same time 
performing real movements in geographic space.
1.2.0. There exists, however, one kind of activity where such a distinc-
tion is not made. This activity is play.
1.2.1. There is no reason to oppose play to cognition. Play has an impor-
tant role in the life of both humans and animals (see Groos 1896).
Play is, without a doubt, one of the most serious and organic necessities 
of the human psyche. Different forms of play accompany humans and 
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the humanity on all stages of their evolution. Carelessly neglecting this 
fact will hardly do any good to science. And, what is especially impor-
tant, play is never opposed to cognition — on the contrary, it is one 
of the most important tools for mastering different real-life situations 
and learning different types of behaviour. Higher animals teach their 
young all the ways of behaviour that are not automatically stored in 
their genetic programme, only through play. Play has great importance 
in learning a type of behaviour, as it permits the modelling of situations 
where the participation of an unprepared individual would put him in 
a risk of death, or situations, the creation of which does not depend on 
the will of the learning individual. Here, a conventional (playful) situa-
tion is a substitute for a non-conventional (real) one. This is extremely 
important. First, the learning individual gets the possibility to freeze the 
situation in time (change his move, “move again”). Second, he learns to 
model the situation in his consciousness, as he will envisage a certain 
amorphous system of reality as a game, the rules of which can and must 
be formulated. Related to this is another important feature: play gives 
a person the chance of a conditional victory over an unconque rable 
(for instance, death) or a very strong (the game of hunting in a primi-
tive society) opponent. This determines both its magical significance 
and extremely important psychological-pedagogical quality: play helps 
us overcome fear in the face of such situations and develops an emo-
tional structure necessary for practical activity. Suvorov’s “penetration 
attack” was a military exercise that turned battle situation into a (con-
ventional) play situation and consisted of two lines (sometimes cavalry 
and in fantry) swiftly closing in on each other and breaking through the 
gaps in the ranks; the goal of the exercise was to overcome fear in the 
face of a real analogical situation and it constructed an emotional model 
of victory. A similar significance in human education is held by sport, 
which in relation to work also functions as play. 
1.2.2. Play is a model of reality of a special kind. It reproduces some of 
the features of reality by translating them to the language of its rules. 
Related to this are its pedagogical and training significance, long before 
noted by psychology and pedagogy. The fear of some aestheticians in 
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front of discussing (in fear of accusations of Kantianism) problems of 
play, and their deep conviction that any juxtaposition of play and art 
would lead to preaching “true art” and denying the existence of connec-
tions between art and the society, reflects a deep unfamiliarity with the 
questions of mixed sciences (psychology, pedagogy).
1.2.2a. Play is the realization of a certain kind of — “playful” — beha-
viour, which is different from both practical behaviour and behaviour 
based on models of the cognitive type. Play is the simultaneous reali-
zation (not their alternation in time!) of practical and conventional 
behaviour. The player must simultaneously remember that he is par-
ticipating in a conventional (not real) situation (a child knows that the 
tiger in front of him is a toy and is not afraid of it), and not remember 
it (when playing, the child considers the toy tiger to be a real one). The 
child is only afraid of the living tiger, the only thing he is not afraid of 
is the stuffed tiger; he is slightly afraid of a striped gown thrown on a 
chair and representing a tiger in the game, that is, he simultaneously is 
and is not afraid of it.
1.2.3. The ability to play means mastering such twofold behaviour.
1.2.3a. An example of a violation of this twofold behaviour, where prac-
tical behaviour wins and the game is taken “for real”, considered reality, 
is an episode recorded by Pushkin after Krylov: children who, soon 
after the suppression of Pugachev’s rebellion started to play “Pugachev’s 
revolt”, “were divided into two factions, the gorodovoye1 and the rebels, 
and the fights between them were serious”. The game transformed into 
a real feud. “A certain Anchalov (who is still alive) nearly became a 
victim of this. Mertvago, who had caught him during one of his raids, 
tried to hang him to a tree by a belt. He was cut free by a passing soldier” 
(Pushkin 1940: 492).
1.2.3b. An example of a violation of this twofold behaviour, where 
conventional behaviour wins and the game is taken as pointless, “non-
serious” behaviour that has completely lost its connection to reality, is 
1 that is, the gendarmerie — T. P.
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an episode from L. N. Tolstoy’s novel, Childhood: “Woloda’s condescen-
sion did not please us much. On the contrary, his lazy, tired expression 
took away all the fun of the game. When we sat on the ground and 
imagined that we were sitting in a boat and either fishing or rowing with 
all our might, Woloda persisted in sitting with folded hands or in any-
thing but a fisherman’s posture. I made a remark about it, but he replied 
that, whether we moved our hands or not, we should neither gain nor 
lose ground — certainly not advance at all, and I was forced to agree 
with him. Again, when I pretended to go out hunting, and, with a stick 
over my shoulder, set off into the wood, Woloda only lay down on his 
back with his hands under his head, and said that he supposed it was all 
the same whether he went or not. Such behaviour and speeches cooled 
our ardour for the game and were very disagreeable — the more so 
since it was impossible not to confess to oneself that Woloda was right. 
I myself knew that it was not only impossible to kill birds with a stick, 
but to shoot at all with such a weapon. Still, it was the game, and if we 
were once to begin reasoning thus, it would become equally impossible 
for us to go for drives on chairs. […] If we were always to judge from 
reality, games would be nonsense; but if games were nonsense, what else 
would there be left to do?“2
1.2.4. In this case, if a person using a cognitive model of the ordinary 
type practices a single type of behaviour at any given moment in time, 
then a play-type model engages a person in two types of behaviour at 
any given moment — a practical and a conventional one.
1.2.5. The fact that the same stimulus will simultaneously evoke more 
than one conditioned reaction, that the same element can evoke two dif-
ferent behaviour structures, and while being included in both of these, 
it carries different meanings and, therefore, becomes different from 
itself — this fact has a deep significance and reveals the social signifi-
cance of play-type models in a remarkable manner.
2 Tolstoy 1991: 29–30. — T. P.
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1.2.6. In a play-type model, each of its elements and the model itself as 
a whole, being identical to itself, is more than just itself. Play models 
randomness, incomplete determination, the probability of processes 
and phenomena. This is why a logical-cognitive model is more suited 
for recreating the language of a perceived phenomenon, its inner nature, 
while a play-type model is more suited for recreating its speech, which is 
incarnated in a material that is arbitrary in relation to language.
Examples:
1.2.6a. The verbal text of a play functions as the language of the system 
in relation to its stage performance. Its incarnation is coupled with the 
univocal becoming equivocal due to the introduction of circumstances 
that are “random” in relation to the verbal text. The meaning of the 
verbal text is unchanged, but it ceases to be the only one. The theatrical 
performance is a played version of the text of a play.
Note: The relationship between language and speech is different 
in art than it is in linguo-semantic systems: the speech of the model 
is perceived as the language of the modelled reality (in a work of art, 
randomness becomes and is perceived as a recreation of regularity in 
reality). 
1.2.6b. Play is a special kind of representation of a combination of 
re gular and random processes. Thanks to the pronounced repeatabil-
ity (regularity) of situations (rules of the game), any deviation becomes 
especially significant. At the same time, the base rules do not permit to 
predict all the “moves”, which appear as random in relation to the basic 
repetitions. This means that each element (move) has a double meaning, 
serving as a confirmation of a rule on one level and a deviation from it 
on another. The double (or multiple) meaning of the elements makes us 
perceive play-type models as highly significant and semantically richer 
in comparison to corresponding logico-scientific models:
Сколько надо отваги,  How much courage is needed
Чтоб играть на века,  To play for ever,
Как играют овраги,  As the ravines play,
Как играет река,  As the river plays,
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Как играют алмазы,  As the diamonds play,
Как играет вино,  As the wine plays,
Как играть без отказа  How we sometimes have to play
Иногда суждено,  With no way to refuse,
Как игралось подростку  As a young girl played
На народе простом  To simple folks
Б белом платье в полоску In a white dress with a ribbon
И с косою жгутом.  And her hair in a plait.
 (Pasternak 1965: 417)
1.2.7. In relation to a logical model homomorphic to it, a play-type 
model is not perceived through the antithesis, “true—false”, but as a 
“richer—poorer” (both of them true) reflection of life. Cf. a determin-
istic ethical model of human behaviour is considered to be too correct, 
and is contrasted with a play-type (artistic) model that permits non-
univocal decisions. At the same time, both of these are opposed (as true) 
to the model of amoral behaviour. 
1.2.7a. Example: In Redemption, Tolstoy contrasts Lisa’s and Karenin’s 
ethical images, on one hand, and Fedya Protasov’s, on the other, to state 
institutions. This is the antithesis of morality and amorality. But Lisa’s 
morality is too correct, unambiguous: “The thing that tortured me the 
most was I seemed to love both of you at once, and that made me seem 
so indecent to myself”3.
A different position: “Oh, my wife was quite an ideal woman. I don’t 
know why I should say was, by the way, because she’s still living. But 
there’s something — I don’t know; it’s rather difficult to explain — But 
you know how pouring champagne into a glass makes it froth up into 
a million iridescent little bubbles? Well, there was none of that in our 
married life. There was no fizz in it, no sparkle, no taste, phew! The days 
were all one colour — flat and stale and grey as the devil. And that’s 
why I wanted to get away and forget. You can’t forget unless you play.”4
Notes: From the context of the play, it follows that here, “to forget” 
means reaching a conditional, playful solution for the conflicts that 
3 Tolstoy, Hopkins 1919: 39 — T. P.
4 Tolstoy, Hopkins 1919: 39 — T. P.
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are unsolvable in practical behaviour in general or in the limits of the 
current social system.
This phenomenon that psychologically can be interpreted as psy-
chotherapy, may be compared to the phenomenon of catharsis in art 
(compare to Lermontov’s “I was saved from him [the Demon — J. L.] 
by poetry”).
1.2.8. Play-type models most often emerge as intuitive ones. It may be 
possible to develop a framework for studying them based on multivalent 
logic.
2.0. Whereas in relation to the logical-cognitive systems correspond-
ing to it, play is a model with a greater degree of randomness, it can be 
characterized as a more deterministic system in relation to the activity 
it models.
2.1. Independent of whether its rules have been formulated or not, by 
turning a life situation into a game, we subject amorphous reality to 
the laws of play (the organizing principle of a real situation is perceived 
through modelling it in conventional categories of “rules” and “moves”).
2.1.1. This is what the analysis of conflict situations using mathematical 
game theory is based on. It must be emphasized, however, that game 
theory, which studies the most efficient behaviour in conflict situations, 
gives the term “game” a different meaning than what it has in psycho-
logical literature (and in the present study). Employing the terminology 
used in this work, it would be more accurate to say that game theory 
studies not conflict situations but play-type models of conflict situations 
created by mathematicians, which can in certain cases be considered to 
be equivalent to real conflicts. The realization that the mathematical 
apparatus is to be applied not directly to real life conflict situations but 
to the play-type models that these conflicts have first been transformed 
to and that a thorough study of the structure of play-type models is 
therefore needed, could open up new perspectives for game theory.
2.2. [An explanation to 2.0.] In relation to the real-life situation that 
corresponds to it, a play-type model is: 
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a) More deterministic. Let us imagine a situation, the cause of which 
we cannot establish in real life. In a game, however, having transformed 
this situation into some sort of a game state (move), we can explain its 
development from a previous state using the rules of the game.
b) Less deterministic. In real life, a large number of restrictions is 
placed on every existing situation, which determine the possibility of 
its transition to just one subsequent situation. In a play-type model, all 
restrictions not determined by the rules are lifted. As a result, the player 
always has the possibility to choose, and his actions have alternatives 
(the moment when the player has no more choices, the game has lost its 
meaning; a certain set of games is based on exactly placing the “oppo-
sing” player in a situation where no choices exist, that is, in a situation 
that is already not a play-situation). Another thing related to this is the 
conventionality of time in a game, its reversibility, the possibility to 
“re-play”.
2.2.1. As a result of this, the same event in a game situation will have 
a different information value than in a life situation. Let us imagine a 
situation where a year has passed during the events and all the partici-
pants have become a year older. This information follows directly from 
the objective duration of the events and is completely predictable. Now, 
let us imagine a different situation: we are acting as if a year has gone 
past and everyone is a year older. Naturally, we could play differently, 
propose a different move (just like a playwright does when he sets the 
period of time between the acts according to his conception). In this 
case, the choice of a “move” from among all the possible moves becomes 
highly informative. The question, “Why did a year go by?” which is 
meaningless in a real-life situation, acquires a deep meaning in any 
play-type model of this situation.
2.2.2. Hence, a play-type model is suitable for the reproduction of a 
creative act.
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Example: In Pasternak’s poetry, a creative act is an act of play, whereas 
the creator, God, often takes the guise of an actor (director) who 
“played” the Universe5:
Так играл пред землей  A talented director once played
   молодою
Одаренный один режиссер, In front of the young Earth in 
       this way,
Что носился как дух над  Floating above the waters like a 
   водою      ghost
И ребро сокрушенное тёр. And holding a broken rib.
И, протискавшись в мир And, making his way into the 
   из-за дисков      world from behind the spheres
Наобум размещенных светил, Of scattered spotlights,
За дрожащую руку артистку Led an actress to her fateful debut,
На дебют роковой выводил. Holding her trembling hand.
        (Pasternak 1965: 202)
3.0. Art has a number of characteristics that are related to play-type 
models. The perception (and creation) of a work of art requires a cer-
tain — artistic — kind of behaviour that has several characteristics in 
common with playful behaviour.
3.0.1. The most important characteristic of artistic behaviour is that the 
person practicing it simultaneously carries out two different actions: 
he experiences all the emotions that an analogous real-world situation 
would evoke and is, at the same time, clearly aware that there is no need 
to perform the actions related to the situation (for instance, helping 
out the hero). Artistic behaviour is a synthesis of the practical and the 
factitious.
Note: The rather important distinction between the artistic beha-
viour of the author and that of the reader (audience) is not explored 
here.
5 It would be very tempting to construct a history of the attitude towards modelling 
based on a study of the representation of the act of creation in world literature: 
mythological texts, cosmogonic themes in world literature (Milton, Lomonosov, 
Radishchev) and contemporary poets would provide an extremely interesting sub-
ject matter. The inverse side of this would be a study of the concept of destruction — 
of eschatological texts.
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3.0.2. Example:
Над вымыслом слезами обольюсь. I Weep over fiction.
  (Pushkin 1940: 228)
What we have here is a brilliant characterization of the dual nature of 
artistic behaviour: it would seem as if the knowledge that what is in 
front of us is a piece of fiction should rule out tears. Or vice-versa: the 
emotion that evokes the tears should make us forget that what is in front 
of us is a piece of fiction. In reality, both of these — opposite — types of 
behaviour exist simultaneously and one enhances the other.
3.1. This characteristic becomes especially meaningful in art: each ele-
ment of an artistic model and the model as a whole are simultaneously 
parts of more than one behavioural system, while acquiring their own 
distinctive meaning in each of these. The meanings A and A’ of each of 
the elements, levels, and the structure as a whole do not replace but are 
in a relation with each other. The principle of play becomes the basis of 
semantic organization.
3.1.2. Let us look at three kinds of texts: an example presented in a sci-
entific treatise, a parable in a religious text, and a fable. The examp le 
presented in a treatise is unambiguous, and this is the source of its value. 
It is an interpretation of a general law and is in this sense a model of an 
abstract idea. The ecclesiastical-ritual text is often constructed by the 
principle of multi-layered semantics. In this case, however, the same 
signs serve to express different content on different structural-seman-
tic levels. Moreover, the meanings that are accessible to a given reader 
because of his level of sanctity, devotion, “learning” etc, are inaccessible 
to another who has not yet reached this level. When a new semantic 
level “opens up” before the reader, the old one is discarded because for 
him, it no longer contains the truth. Masonic symbolism and — fol-
lowing Masonic example — the writings of early Decembrist societies 
are based on this principle. The same text could have a secret (conspi-
ratorial) meaning for the devoted and a trivial one for the “profane”. 
Meanwhile, a truth is uncovered for everyone — according to their 
capacity to admit it. For the “profane”, the text contains a truth that 
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ceases to be one for the devoted. For a given reader, then, the text carries 
only a single meaning.
An artistic text is constructed differently: each detail, but also the 
text as a whole is a part of different systems of relations; as a result, it 
concurrently has multiple different meanings.
3.1.3. Example: Let us take a look at the monument to Russian spiri-
tual grandiloquence, The story of Law and Grace (Слово о законе и 
благодати), as a piece of ecclesiastical discourse and as an artistic text. 
This work of metropolitan Illarion is characterized by a clear distinction 
between the different levels.
On the first level, freedom and slavery are contrasted to each other 
as positive and negative: 
Freedom Sarah Isaac
Slavery Hagar Ishmael
After this, another level of oppositions is introduced: “Christianity-
Paganism”, which implies both new signs and a new reading of the old 
ones.
Christianity Christ — crucifi xion Christian lands
Paganism Isaac — Abraham’s feast (eating the calf) Judaea
The third level is the opposition of “new” and “old”:
New New Christians Kievan Rus’
Old Old Christians Byzantium
And all this taken together is packed into the antithesis of “grace–law”.
This way, a member of the audience who saw fables as just short 
prose stories could here, too, receive a message about the rivalry 
between Sarah and Hagar. In this case, each word would be a sign with 
a common linguistic content. The antithesis of Grace and Law presented 
throughout the text would, however, attune the reader to look for a 
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hidden text — “figurative speech”, which is described in the Compen-
dium of Svyatoslav (Изборник Святослава) from 1073 as “one thing 
is what is said, but another thing is what is meant6”. In this case, upon 
reception on the first semantic level, Law was given the following syno-
nyms: Hagar, Ishmael (in opposition to Isaac), Isaac (in opposition to 
Christ), Sarah (in opposition to the Virgin Mary), Judaea (in opposition 
to Christianity), Old Testament, and Byzantium (in opposition to the 
Kievan Rus’). The meaning of all these and other signs was slavery — a 
word that for the XI century Rus’ was full of social meaning and was 
related to the semiotics of rejection, abjection, the lowest social status. 
Grace was given the synonyms: Sarah (in opposition to Hagar), Isaac (in 
opposition to Ishmael), Virgin Mary, Christ, Christianity, New Testa-
ment, Rus’. All these signs had a common meaning — freedom, social 
value, the right for social ambition, and religious significance (“Law 
and Grace are embodied in Hagar and Sarah — the servant Hagar and 
the free Sarah […] and Grace and Truth was born, not Law; a son, not 
a slave”)7.
On the second level, the social-symbolic opposition between the free 
man and the slave took a new turn — it was equated to the opposition, 
“Christianity–Paganism”. Christianity was perceived as spiritual eman-
cipation, giving every true believer that kind of moral significance that 
only a free man would have in the social hierarchy. 
And finally, a member of the audience familiar with the complicated 
relationship between the court of Prince Yaroslav and Byzantium would 
equate the antithesis of “new” and “old” people (“A servant you were 
formerly, then free”8; my italics — J. L.) and interpret Grace and all its 
synonyms as symbols of Rus’, and Law — as Byzantium.
The Story of Law and Grace is, however, a work of art, which in this 
case is reflected in the fact that the meanings do not invalidate each 
other, ensuring the gradual immersion of the non-initiated to the secret 
6 «Есть ино нечто глаголюшти, а ин разум указуюшти» — T. P.
7 «Образ же закону и благодати — Агарь и Сарра, работнаа Агарь и свободнаа 
Сарра. […] И родися благодать и истина, а не закон; сын а не раб» — T. P.
8 «работная прежде ти, потом свободная» — T. P.
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wisdom, but exist concurrently, creating the play effect. Illarion allows 
his audience to relish in the abundance of meanings and possible inter-
pretations of the text.
3.2. The mechanism of play involves not the static simultaneous coexis-
tence of different meanings, but the constant awareness of the possibility 
of alternate meanings to the one that is currently being perceived. The 
play effect means that different meanings of the same element do not 
appear in static coexistence but “twinkle”. Each interpretation makes 
up a separate synchronic slice, yet retains a memory of earlier meanings 
and the awareness of the possibility of future ones.
3.3. Hence, an exclusive and unitary definition of the meaning of an 
artistic model can only be made possible by encoding it into the lan-
guage of non-artistic modelling systems.
3.3.1. An artistic model is always more extensive and closer to life than 
its interpretation, and the interpretation can always be only an approxi-
mation.
3.3.2. This also relates to the widely known phenomenon where enco-
ding an artistic system into a non-artistic language always leaves an 
“untranslatable” residue — that sort of surplus information that is pos-
sible only in an artistic text.
3.4. Play and art, both of them working towards the important goal of 
getting a grasp of the world, both share the same common trait: the 
conditional solution of situations. By exchanging the immensely comp-
licated rules of the reality for a simpler system, they psychologically 
present following the rules of the given modelling system as solving a 
real-life situation. Consequently, play and art (even a bloody spectacle 
like bullfighting, or tragic art) are not only (gnoseologically) means of 
perception but also (psychologically) means of recreation. They provide 
solutions, which are psychologically absolutely necessary for a man.
4.0. Art is not a form of play.
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4.0.1. The existence of a genetic link between art and play, established by 
ethnography, just like the fact that the bi- or multivalence originating 
in play has become one of the core structural characteristics of art, does 
not mean that art and play are the same.
4.0.2. Play means mastering certain skills, training in a conditional 
situation; art means mastering the world (modelling the world) in a 
conditional situation. Play is “just like an activity”, art is “just like life”.
4.0.3. It follows therefore, that the goal of play is following the rules. The 
goal of art is the truth, expressed in the language of conventional rules.
4.0.4. Hence, play cannot be a means of storing information and deve-
loping new meanings (it only serves as a way to master skills that have 
already been acquired). This, however, is what the essence of art is.
4.1. Especially complicated is the question of performing arts, the rela-
tionship of which with play (it is not by accident that we speak of “the 
actor’s play”, “the pianist’s play”) is a more complex problem.
4.1.1. Art is not a form of play, but the elements of play exist (in a dif-
ferent manner) both in the behaviour of the creator and the audience 
(analogous to technical mastery).
4.1.2. Acting and ballet dancing historically and typologically take up 
a transitional position between play and art. But while both have some 
aspects or others in common with either play or art, these common 
traits serve to emphasize the difference between these kinds of model-
ling activity.
4.1.3. The relationship between the performance and the performed 
text is the same as between a performed artistic text and a non-artistic 
model ling structure equivalent to it: it sharply increases “play” — that 
is, the multitude of functions that elements have in interlinked seman-
tic fields and the relative randomness of these links (see 5.1 and 5.2). It 
can be said that if a stage show is the performance of a play, then the 
play is the “performance” of the artistic idea equivalent to it. The term 
“performed idea” is different from “materialized idea” because it does 
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not presume the illustrative materialization of an abstraction, but the 
creation of a system of multi-layered probabilistic intersections, a sys-
tem that does not illustrate a non-artistic idea but, building upon it as 
on a lower-level modelling system, carries information that cannot be 
transmitted by any other means.
5.1. The theoretical, but not genetic, grounds of the connection between 
the two spheres psychologically as distant as art and play can be seen in 
an important trait of artistic models: a scientist creates a model based on 
a hypothesis, whereas an artist creates a hypothesis based on a model. 
He models an uncomprehended (or not completely comprehended) 
object.
5.2. A model of this type cannot be strictly deterministic. It must inevi-
tably be more flexible than any theoretical model.
5.3. Related to this is the problem of the reasons for the high stability of 
artistic models, still not completely understood.
5.4.0. This leads us to the most essential characteristic of a work of art 
as a model. A scientific model recreates the system of the object in a 
descriptive form. It models the “language” of the system being studied. 
An artistic model recreates the “speech” of the object. In relation to 
the reality that is perceived in the light of an already mastered artis-
tic model, however, this model functions as a language that discreetly 
organizes the new perceptions (speech).
Воображаясь героиней  Imagining herself the heroine
Своих возлюбленных творцов, Of her beloved authors —
Клариссой, Юлией, Дельфиной, Clarissa, Julie, Delphine —
Татьяна в тишине лесов  Tatiana in the stillness of the woods
Одна с опасной книгой бродит, Alone roams with a dangerous book;
Она в ней ищет и находит In it she seeks and finds
Свой тайный жар, свои мечты... Her secret glow, her daydreams...
                  (Евгений Онегин)                         (Eugene Onegin, III, X9)
9 Vladimir Nabokov’s translation. — T. P.
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For Tatiana herself, her personality is a non-discrete series (“speech 
of the system”). She perceives herself through the identification with 
certain artistic types that here fulfil the function of a language. At the 
same time, in relation to the theories of pre-romanticism, expressed in 
an abstract form, the figures of Clarissa, Julia, and Delphine function 
as speech.
1 2 3 4
Reality Th eoretical model Art Reality
Object → Our concept of the object → Work of art →
Reality inter-
preted in the 
light of prior 
artistic experi-
ence.
Non-discrete 
series (speech)
Discrete series 
(language)
Non-discrete series 
(speech) in relation to 
2, discrete series (lan-
guage) in relation to 4
Non-discrete 
series (speech)
5.4.1. From the above, it follows that the work of art is not created as 
a strictly deterministic actualization of a given constructive principle. 
The constructive idea is actualized with a certain degree of independ-
ence on different levels, and if each level taken separately is constructed 
based on certain specific structural laws, then their combination most 
likely follows only probabilistic laws.
5.4.2. In the case of a scientific model, these random elements would 
simply be eliminated as accidental. In the case of an artistic model, the 
language it actualizes, one that is artistically presupposed (language of 
a style, of a movement), is related to not only a natural language (“Rus-
sian”, “French” in literature, the language of natural visual shapes in 
painting), but also the language that is yet to be reconstructed based on 
the speech of the given artistic text (model). Meanwhile, a “random” ele-
ment, clearly part of the speech in one system, could turn out to belong 
to the language of another. This is the basis for the suggestive meaning-
fulness of details characteristic to newer and most recent art. It is 
important to note here that the randomness of the given concatenation 
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of the details is not eliminated but, remaining random and meaningless 
for one constructive language, they are simultaneously highly meaning-
ful for another.
III
1.0. The specific constructive nature of art makes it an extremely 
exceptional means for storing information. Works of art are not only 
characterized by an extremely large capacity for and economical sto rage 
of very complex information, but they also:
1.1. Can increase the amount of information stored in them. This 
unique characteristic of works of art makes them similar to biological 
systems and gives them an extremely special place among everything 
created by the mankind.
1.2. Give their consumer exactly the kind of information they need and 
are prepared to receive. Adapting itself to the consumer, a work of art 
simultaneously adapts the consumer to itself, preparing him for the 
reception of a new portion of not yet transmitted information.
2. Studying these characteristics of art as a means for storing informa-
tion (just like the characteristics of art as a model in general) not only 
has theoretical significance, stimulating the creation of an apparatus 
for the description of extremely complex systems, but also a practical 
purpose. If bionics allows us to use the constructive principles of bio-
logy accessible to us for technological purposes, then it should not be 
impossible, in principle, for a science to emerge that would study the 
constructive principles of art with the goal of solving certain technical 
problems (for example, of storing information).
3. Scientific models are means of perception that organize the intel-
lect of a human being in a certain way. Play-type models, which 
organi ze behaviour, are a school of activity (in this sense, it is clear 
how the unsubstantiated idea that the existence of a playful element in 
art is opposed to the notion of its social effectiveness — in reality, the 
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cont rary is true: play is one of the means of transforming an abstract 
idea into behaviour, into reality).
3.1. Artistic models are a unique combination of scientific and play-
type models, which simultaneously organize both the intellect and 
behaviour. In comparison to art, play is without content, while science 
is without effect.10
Translated by Tanel Pern
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Искусство в ряду моделирующих систем
Эта статья Ю. М. Лотмана, опубликованная в третьем томе Трудов 
по знаковым системам в 1967 г., посвящена рассмотрению того, 
что нового в понимании искусства дает включение его в ряд 
моделирующих систем, а также выяснению вопроса о том, позволяет 
ли такое включение раскрыть в произведениях искусства черты, 
присущие моделям вообще. Искусство при этом рассматривается 
в ряду вторичных моделирующих систем с целью обнаружения 
специфических черт, выделяющих искусство из ряда других 
моделирующих систем, и сравнивается с игровой и научной моделями. 
10 Originally published in Russian as Лотман, Ю. М. 1967. Тезисы к проблеме 
“Искусство в ряду моделирующих систем”. Труды по знаковым системам 
(Sign Systems Studies) 3: 130–145. 
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Художественные модели представляют собой соединение научной и 
игровой модели, организуя интеллект и поведение одновременно. 
Kunst modelleerivate süsteemide seas
Käesolev Juri Lotmani artikkel, mis on algselt avaldatud 1967. aastal 
Töid märgisüsteemide alalt 3. köites tegeleb kunstilise modelleerimise 
prob leemidega. Artikli püstitatud põhiküsimused on, kas kunstil kui 
modelleerival süsteemil esineb mingeid jooni, mis on ühised kõigile model-
leerivatele süsteemidele, ja millised võiksid olla need iseloomulikud jooned, 
mis kunsti teistest modelleerivatest süsteemidest eristavad. Kunsti käsitle-
takse teisese modelleeriva süsteemina, täpsemini, mängulaadse mudelina, 
millele on iseloomulik praktilise ja tingliku käitumise üheaegne esinemine 
ning pidev teadlikkus alternatiivsetest tähendustest sellele, mida hetkel 
tajutakse. Samal ajal on kunstil küll mängulaadseid omadusi, kuid ta ka 
erineb mängust, kuna mäng on olemuslikult orienteeritud reeglite järgi-
misele, samas kui kunst on oluliselt paindlikum mudel, mille eesmärgiks on 
tõde. Kunst on eriline modelleeriv süsteem, kuna sobib ühelt poolt suure 
hulga keerulise informatsiooni talletamiseks, aga teisalt ta kasvatab seda 
infot ning transformeerib ka mudeli tarbijat.
